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STATE INTERESTS AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE: A
LOOK AT THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
THEODORE R. BOEHM*
I. INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY
The tender offer in today's economy is a formidable tool for effecting
rapid corporate consolidations. In obvious hostile response to "quickie"
takeovers, some 37 states have enacted some form of tender offer legisla-
tion. The basic thesis of this article is that these state laws have largely
been improperly analyzed as a species of securities regulation or corpora-
tion law. Rather, they serve state interests that are largely different from
the interest in investor protection manifested in the federal securities laws.
Because the state and federal interests are not necessarily inconsistent, the
existing federal statutes should not preempt most of the state tender offer
laws. Nor do state takeover laws inevitably impose excessive burdens on
interstate commerce. The relationship between an affected corporation
.and the regulating state, and the manner in which the regulation operates
dictates the state laws' viability under the commerce clause. Moreover,
because the need for tender offer regulation is essentially a legislative or
political judgment, the views of the state legislatures are entitled to signifi-
cant weight.
In general, and without regard to specific forms of regulation or the
offers to which they apply, state laws regulating tender offers for all or
controlling blocks of shares of widely owned corporations will be referred
to as "takeover" legislation. A "takeover offer" - normally an announce-
ment to the financial world that the offeror will pay a stated price in cash
or securities for some or all of a "target" company's shares - triggers the
operation of these laws. Several regulatory approaches recur in state takeo-
ver legislation,' and most of the laws combine more than one. First, and
simplest, is a pure prenotification provision, requiring the offeror to inform
the target, the appropriate state administrator, or both, of his intentions
before commencing the offer. Typically, some type of "disclosure state-
ment" must be filed in connection with the notice. Second, there may be
a minimum period for which the offer, once made, must stay open. Third,
there may be a hearing procedure in which the state administrator reviews
the offer, or more typically the offeror's disclosure of statutorily prescribed
* Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis, Indiana; A.B. (1960) Brown University; J.D. (1963)
Harvard University; Member District of Columbia and Indiana Bars.
I For more in depth analyses of the similarities and differences among state takeover laws
see M. LWTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEovERs AND FREEZEOus 239-40 (1978); Nathan and
Maloney, State Tender Offer Statutes: An Analysis of the Practical and Policy
Considerations, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 647 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of State
Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 872 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Response to Great Western].
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matters incident to the offer. Fourth, the same states regulate various
substantive aspects of the offer such as proration of acceptances in the
event of over-subscription. For. convenience, these provisions will be re-
ferred to, respectively, as "prenotification," "minimum period," "hearing"
and "substantive."
IX. THE PRESENT LEGAL AND BusINEss CLIMATE
Many non-legal developments in the tender offer field necessarily bear
on the practical consequences of state takeover legislation. Paramount
among these are the tender offer techniques used by offerors and targets
and the economic climate that has influenced the need for and scope of
tender offer regulation. Offerors' techniques have been refined substan-
tially since the late 1960's when Congress established the basic framework
for federal tender offer regulation in the Williams Act, enacted in 1968 as
an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The Williams Act
requires offerors to file a disclosure document with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) at the time the tender offer is made. It also
includes some substantive provisions, notably a minimum seven day offer
period.3
In 1967 the SEC advocated the enactment of federal legislation, advis-
ing the Congress that tender offers, then totally unregulated, were unfair
to investors.4 The SEC described tender offers as "invitation[s] to the
public security holder who 'tenders' the security to give the other party an
option to be exercised only if certain minimum shares are tendered within
a specified time and perhaps specifying a maximum which the original
offeror is prepared to take." Very few tenders were for 100% of the target
shares,5 and at least one study concluded that exchange offers6 were gener-
ally more successful than cash offers.
7
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. 11977) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act].
3 Id. § 78n(d)(5) (1976). If a tender offer is for fewer than all of a company's shares, the
Williams Act's minimum offer period is 10 days. Id. (d)(6). Moreover, the Act then requires
prorata acceptance of shares if more are tendered than the offeror solicited. Id.
Proposed Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 14475
and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
The SEC characterized tender offers as one-sided documents. Early stockholder responses
were said to limit their ability to take advantage of more attractive subsequent offers. Moreo-
ver, tendering shareholders had no assurance that the offerors finally would purchase their
tendered shares.
I Proposed Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Commerce, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 180-81 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
6 Id. The SEC defines an exchange offer as "a tender offer for, or request or invitation
for tenders of, any security in exchange for any consideration other than for all cash." 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-13(b) (1978).
1 See Austin & Fishman, The Tender Offer, May-June 1969 MERGERS & AcQuisrrioNs 13-
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More recently, offerors typically have resorted to unconditional cash
offers at a premium in the range of 20%-50% above the market without
limiting the number of shares they will accept. As a practical matter, the
offeror thereby eliminates much of the doubt in the minds of the sharehold-
ers as to whether or when their shares will be taken up. Because no securi-
ties are offered in a cash deal, registration under the Securities Act of 1933,
and the attendant delays, are eliminated. By the 1970's, offerors had added
a short offer period to this general strategy, giving rise to the "Saturday
Night Special." As offerors perfected their methods, they minimized in-
cumbent management's opportunities to mount significant defenses or at-
tract alternative bids for the corporation.' Meanwhile, the principal effect
of the state takeover laws, where they applied, was to inject some delay in
consummating the transaction This delay could enhance the develop-
ment of an auction market for the corporation's shares, driving their price
up. Although someone other than the original bidder might end up pur-
chasing the target, rarely would the target remain an independent entity.",
A second major phenomenon in recent years is the growth of the arbi-
trage industry" to the extent that some have called for federal regulation
of arbitrage activities in connection with tender offers.'2 In oversimplified
terms,'" arbitrage activity places substantial blocks of the target's shares
in the hands of professionals, who in general have no intention whatever
of becoming long term owners. Rather, their objective is to make a quick
profit on the transaction by reselling the shares, whether to the original
offeror or a subsequent bidder, and go on to the next deal. Their evalua-
tion of a tender offer turns on several variables. They estimate the probable
length of time between their purchase in the open market and their suc-
cessful placement of the shares with the original bidder or a competing
bidder. The costs they will incur in the interim, and the risk that they will
be unable to put the shares to the original or an alternative bidder must
also be considered. In the typical case of an unconditional "any or all"
offer, the arbitrage community evaluation of the tender offer is often sub-
stantially simplified because of the absence of any material risk of failure.
The proliferation of this offer strategy undoubtedly has increased the level
of capital and intellectual resources devoted to arbitrage over the past
decade. In sum, increasingly sophisticated offeror strategies, and the
14 cited in Note, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage be Regulated?, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1000, 10009
n.44.
. Flom, The Role of the Takeover In The American Economy, 32 Bus. LAW. 1299, 1299-
1300 (1977).
'Id.
10 Liman, Has The Tender Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 687, 689
(1978).
"1 See text accompanying note 13 infra. See generally E. A8ANow & H. EINHoRN, TENDER
OFFERS FOR COPORATE CONTROL 173-203 (1973) [hereinafter cited as AuNow & EINHORN].
12 See note 7 supra.
"1 For an expansive discussion of arbitrage activities in the tender offer market see
ARA~ow & EINHom, supra note 11.
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emergence of an active arbitrage community represent forces that have
aligned themselves on the side of the offeror to a much greater extent than
was the case a decade ago.
The current inflationary economy is yet a third highly relevant develop-
ment in the field of tender offers. Entry into a new market by acquiring
an existing company always has been quicker than creating a new plant
and facility and always has had the advantage of simultaneously eliminat-
ing one competitor from the point of view of the potential entrant. How-
ever, largely due to inflation, the shares of many well-managed companies
trade at prices substantially below the present cost of duplicating the
companies' facilities. The undervaluation of the shares thus provides an
additional incentive for employing the tender offer as a means of entering
a particular market.
Moreover, the contention that tender offers serve to displace inefficient
management is of doubtful validity in today's economy. Indeed, many
recent targets have been labeled well-managed, growing, productive opera-
tions, 4 and many successful offerors retain the target's top management.
For all these reasons, the tender offer has become an increasingly popu-
lar mechanism for corporate expansion. Indeed, recent predictions of fed-
eral legislation limiting combinations of large companies have led to pre-
dictions of increased tender offer activity by those seeking to get through
the door before Congress slams it shut.
The increasing inclination to undertake tender offers has been coupled
with a generally decreasing effectiveness of corporate structural devices,
such as staggered boards and supermajorities, as defensive mechanisms.
Although these may retain some value as "shark repellant," signalling
potential bidders that an offer will meet vigorous resistance in the hope of
deterring the initial offer, generally more aggressive defensive maneuvers
are required to be effective. Some potential or actual targets have issued
shaies that dilute the value of publicly available shares, or acquired regu-
lated businesses. At this writing the "ferocious" defense apparently is
gaining some popularity as a means of making an acquisition such a dis-
tasteful struggle that the offeror loses interest. However, management may
be unwilling or unable to adopt many of these practices for various reasons.
They often involve a combination of business considerations and regard for
the proper exercise of management duties to the corporation that may
render them unattractive or infeasible.
The net result of these admittedly conclusory judgments is that a large
number of corporations are quite vulnerable to the Saturday Night Special
in today's legal and business climate. Whatever "balance" existed between
offerors and targets in 1968 has, through the evolution of refined tender
offer technology and changing economic circumstances, become substan-
tially "tipped" against incumbent management. 5
A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 2 n.l (1978).
"Tender Offers: A Balance Badly Tipped, Address by William Robinson, Twenty-ninth
National Conference of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 26, 1975).
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III. STATE REGULATORY PATTERNS
Against this background 37 states have enacted some form of takeover
legislation. Although certain common themes underlie the statutes, they
vary substantially in a number of material respects. The imposition of
additional delays on regulated offers is the dominant feature of all takeover
statutes presently on the books. As a practical matter, delay facilitates
management's search for a "white knight" or alternative bidder. Obviously
a white knight's decision to enter the bidding to acquire a major publicly
owned corporation involves complex considerations. The compatibility of
the companies' management, products and marketing lines requires ex-
tended analysis. Larger and more diversified targets magnify these issues
and usually carry a higher price tag. Although the investment banking
community has become more sophisticated in facilitating shotgun wed-
dings, a white knight's decision is difficult to make within a few days.
Consequently, longer delays in the consummation of the tender offer in-
crease the likelihood that the target will be able to identify alternative
bidders and induce them to enter the auction.
A pure prenotification statute'" that also establishes a minimum period
during which the offer must stay open, effectively extends the arbitrage
period fr6m the date the offeror announces his intent to make the offer
through to the expiration of the minimum period. After an offer has been
open for an extended period of time, arbitrageurs likely will own major
blocks of stock in the corporation." They rarely will tender until the expira-
tion date is imminent, obviously in the hope that an auction market for
the shares will develop. There is no advantage to committing early to the
initial offeror.
Hearing type statutes"8 inject a new consideration into the game. If the
hearing statutes are valid, the arbitrage community must evaluate the
offer in light of the risk that the hearing will result in either a disallowance
of or perhaps an extended delay in the consummation of the offer. In the
case of a cash tender offer at a substantial premium over the preexisting
market price, disallowing the offer normally would produce a substantial
drop in the trading price of the shares and could even induce panic selling
at levels well below the pre-offer market price. Many state laws increase
the level of arbitrageur uncertainty by not establishing a fixed time frame
for the hearing.19 As noted above, 2° arbitrageurs evaluate the time for which
their investment will be tied up when they decide on the level to which
they can profitably bid up the market price. Since time delays thereby
become a de facto ally of the offeror, hearing type statutes may constitute
a significant deterrent to arbitrage activity in the shares of the target
I' See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-101 to 108 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
'7O'Boyle, Changing Tactics In Tender Offers, 25 Bus. LAW. 863, 866 (1970).
" See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 110C §§ 1-13 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
" See, e.g., HAW. Rv. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to 15 (1976).
20 See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
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during the early stages of the offer. However, if these uncertainties are
resolved within definite periods, it is doubtful that the net result is
changed by the hearings. Approval of the hearings or elimination of the
uncertainties surrounding the consummation of the offer place the arbitra-
geur in a position to evaluate the transaction as though the state statute
did not exist except for the minimum period.
Finally, some states have chosen to enact a variety of substantive provi-
sions as part of their takeover legislation. For the most part, these provi-
sions have little practical consequence. In general, they tend to complicate
otherwise innocuous transactions but do not affect the outcome of the
tender offer in terms of the offeror's ultimate success or failure in acquiring
the target.
Apart from employing different means to regulate tender offers, states
have differed substantially in the selection of the corporations to which
their laws apply. Delaware has made its takeover provision a part of its
general corporation law." It applies to offers for targets that are Delaware
corporations, regardless of their corporate headquarters or physical plant.
On the other hand, many states have sought to regulate tender offers based
on the target's incorporation in the state or having its principal place of
business or substantial assets in the state. Some states have rendered any
of the three sufficient." Others have required combinations of two or
more.? Finally, only Arkansas elected to apply its statute on the basis of
shareholdings in the state. 2' As of this writing, that statute was proposed
to be amended to eliminate that provision.
Since many states apply their statute on only one of these bases, a state
may seek to regulate a transaction to which its sole connection is through
the corporation laws, or the fact that the target has one of its several plants
in that state, or on the ground that it is headquartered in the state, even
though its physical assets and operations are largely elsewhere. Moveover,
these jurisdictional variations raise the possibility that the takeover of a
single corporation could be subject to regulation by at least three and
conceivably more states. This has led to the charge of duplicative, burden-
some and unnecessary state interference with essentially national transac-
tions.2 5 Each of these statutory schemes has, in fact, been tried with vary-
ing degrees of success. Many of the cases litigated to date have involved
one or more of their relatively bizarre applications.
2
1
1 DEL. CODE, tit. 8, § 203 (Cum Supp. 1978).
22 See, e.g., MD. CORP. & Ass'NS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-901(i) (CuM. Supp. 1978).
23 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 552.01(6) (Spec. Pamph. 1979).
24 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to 1264.14 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Section 67-1264(6) defines
"target company" to include any issuer of securities which has equity shareholders in the
state and "is or may be involved in a takeover offer. ... The Arkansas law applies to offers
for or acquisitions of shares of a target company pursuant to a tender offer that meets other
substantive provisions. § 67-1264(5), .2.
2 See E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 232-33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS].
26 See text accompanying notes 27-40 infra.
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IV. LITIGATION To DATE
Any analysis of the current status of state takeover legislation must
begin with Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell." Among the issues
presented to the Supreme Court was whether the officials of one state
(Idaho) are susceptible to service of process and subject to the personal
jurisdiction of a federal district court in another state (Texas). The Fifth
Circuit's holding that the Idaho Securities Commissioner may be sued in
Texas aroused substantial opposition from state enforcement authorities.
Their concerns largely stemmed from the fact that state attorneys general
often have limited or nonexistent out-of-state travel authorization and are
ill equipped to engage in the slam bang megabuck litigation that tender
offers produce. Many view a requirement to defend their actions anywhere
in the nation as a practical imposition on state enforcement officials, par-
ticularly in -light of th6 difficulties of keeping pace with litigation within
their own borders. The issues raised by those points are not treated here
except to observe that the Supreme Court's disposition of Kidwell leaves
the Fifth Circuit's decision as the only federal appellate discussion of the
issues raised by the application of any state's takeover law to an actual
transaction. Kidwell, for reasons that will be examined later,2 held that
(a) the Williams Act preempted the Idaho Act, and (b) the application of
the Idaho Act to Great Western's tender offer for the target constituted an
undue burden on interstate commerce. In that case the target, Sunshine
Mining Company, was incorporated under the laws of the State of Wash-
ington and maintained its corporate headquarters in New York. A princi-
pal subsidiary had its major plant in Maryland. Under these circumstan-
ces the Fifth Circuit held that the federal district court in the Northern
District of Texas properly enjoined the Idaho Commissioner, who asserted
jurisdiction on the basis of Sunshine's silver mine in Idaho, from enforcing
Idaho's takeover law.3" Idaho had essentially a hearing type statute that
could impose unlimited delays in the consummation of the offer.3 '
The Fifth Circuit handed down its decision in Kidwell on August 10,
1978. On November 9, 1978, Dart Industries instituted a new era in state
tender offer litigation by adopting a "Pearl Harbor" approach. Dart filed
its own preemptive lawsuit against state securities officials and the target
corporation and its shareholders, seeking a declaration that the Delaware
and Indiana takeover statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the
offer. 12 Dart announced it intended to make the offer but would not do so
unless and until the court issued a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the state laws. Since the
- 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S.Ct. 2710 (1979).
= 577 F.2d at 1272.
" See text accompanying notes 63-109 infra.
10 IDAHo CoDE §§ 30-1501 to 1513 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
31 Id. § 30-1503(4)-(5).
32 See text accompanying note 33 infra.
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target, P.R. Mallory & Company, was incorporated under Delaware law,
§ 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Act regulated the proposed
offer. Mallory maintained its corporate headquarters in Indianapolis, and
thereby subjected the transaction to the Indiana statute as well.? The
Indiana Securities Commissioner promptly decided to exempt the offer
from the Indiana statute's application, taking the position that full faith
and credit and/or comity rendered it appropriate for Indiana to defer to
Delaware in view of Delaware's conflicting timetable." The target's opera-
tions were to some extent in Indiana, but largely in neither Delaware nor
Indiana. Dart initiated the offer on November 10 when the district court
entered the requested restraining order. The hearing on the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was set for November 14. On November 16, while
evidence was still being taken in the injunction proceeding, Dart increased
its offer from $46 to $51, and Mallory's management recommended that
the shareholders accept the increased offer. Nonetheless, the hearing con-
tinued and the day after argument between Dart and Mallory, its de facto
subsidiary, the court held the Delaware statute unconstitutional, relying
principally on Kidwell.3
Subsequently, at least two courts have declined to enter temporary
restraining orders in circumstances similar to the Dart request. In Tyco
Laboratories, Inc. v. Connelly,3" the district court set a hearing on Tyco's
application for a preliminary injunction, 3 but the question of the validity
of the Massachusetts statute was mooted when Tyco withdrew its offer.?
3 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1 to -12 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 23-2-3-1(j) defines target
company to include any issuer of securities with its principal place of business in the state.
3, Delaware had created a 40-day period within which the offer must be made. Indiana
might permit or force the offer to go forward outside that period. The Commissioner observed
that the full faith and credit clause and doctrines of comity among the states might bear on
the transaction. Without specifying his reasoning, the Commissioner exercised his exemptive
power. Under standard doctrines of full faith and credit, a foreign corporation qualified to
do business in another state generally imports the law of its domiciliary state as to such
matters as the necessary votes for various types of transactions. Reese & Kaufman, The Law
Governing Corporate Affairs, Choices of Law And The Impact Of Full Faith And Credit, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958). Delaware's takeover act, as a part of its general corporation law,
ig perhaps most susceptible of treatment as a variety of corporate governance. So viewed, the
law of the state of domicile may be regarded as controlling when a Delaware corporation
becomes a takeover target. In the event of conflicting regulation, deference to the state of
incorporation at least offers the virtue of predictability and enjoys some support in precedent
from other areas.
3 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978). Similar decisions were rendered by Judge Crowley of
thd Northern District of Illinois in Mite Corporation v. Dixon, No. 79-C-200 (N.D. Ill., Feb.
9, 1979); and Daylin, Inc. v. Uarco, Inc., No. 78-C-4246 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 27, 1978). Although
Mite subsequently announced that it was withdrawing its offer based on its further investiga-
tion of the target, an appeal by the Illinois officials is still pending. The Illinois Act includes
criminal penalties.
31 No. 79-0265 T (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 1979) (bench remarks of Tauro, J.).
31 Tyco's injunctive suit sought to enjoin enforcement of the Massachusetts takeover
statute.
1 Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Connelly, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,933 (D.
Mass. July 12, 1979) (summary of opinion of Tauro, J.).
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Subsequently, in Davlin, Inc. v. Fratkin,39 although indicating an inclina-
tion to agree with Kidwell on the merits, the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania found the matters raised by the application of Davlin's offer for
Narco Scientific Industries sufficiently complex as to require a hearing
before resolution. That court also refused to enter a temporary restraining
order. Finally, in UV Industries v. Posner,4" the district court in Maine
concluded that the target's application for a preliminary injunction under
the Maine Takeover Act should be granted. It held that the defendant's
actions clearly violated the Maine statute and that the balance of the
injury tipped more strongly in favor of the plaintiff target which was re-
questing injunctive relief than in favor of the offeror which claimed uncon-
stitutionality of the Maine statute. As of this writing, all of these cases,
except Dart and Tyco, are still pending. An obvious conclusion is that the
grant of a temporary restraining order against enforcement of a state stat-
ute, even though it can be outstanding for only ten days under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65, may be decisive in ensuring the immediate
success of the offer, as happened in Dart. If no restraining order issues, the
long term outcome is more problematic.
V. THE NATURE OF STATE TAKEOVER LAWS
Early in the development of state tender offer regulation, perceptive
observers questioned exactly what the nature of these new state laws was."
Many commentators and courts have taken the position, or assumed with-
out explanation, that these statutes constitute a species of securities regu-
lation grounded in a state interest in the protection of investors. Indeed,
according to the Fifth Circuit, the Idaho officials defended the Idaho stat-
ute in Kidwell principally on the basis that it was justified as an investor
protection measure.42 Most authorities who regard the statutes as a variety
of securities regulation conclude that the statutes are unconstitutional, or
at least undesirable, in that they create a crazy quilt of conflicting and
obstructionist regulatory patterns. 3 Other recent and thoughtful analyses,
viewing the statutes as essentially securities regulatory laws nonetheless
find them not preempted. Briefly stated their conclusion has been that the
provisions are essentially consistent with the investor protection rationale
of the Williams Act even though they may impose constraints beyond those
adopted by Congress."
3' No. 79-161 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 1979).
" 466 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Me. 1979).
" See, e.g., Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W. Rs. L. Rav. 681
(1970).
42 577 F.2d at 1279.
a See DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFESM, supra note 25, at 232-33; Moylan, State Regula-
tion of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687, 700-02 (1975); Wilmer & Landy, The Tender
Trap: State Takeover Laws and Their Constitutionality, 45 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 1, 17-23 (1976);
Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CALIF.
L. REv. 1133, 1152-62 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Commerce 
Clause Limitations]."
" See, e.g., Response to Great Western, supra note 1; Note, Securities Law and The
1979]
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Certainly many, but not all, of the statutes currently on the books
speak in terms of disclosure requirements and vest hearing jurisdiction in
the state securities administrator. On the other hand, it has been observed
that the statutes apply regardless of the residence of the shareholders of
the target, raising the possibility that the investor protection rationale is
a facade. Others have taken the view that takeover legislation is essentially
analogous to organic corporate law.4 5 Delaware is consistent with this view.
That state, in the absence of a blue sky law, adopted takeover legislation
as a part of its general corporation laws." As such, the statutes apply only
to targets incorporated under the law of that state regardless of the location
of their assets or corporate domicile. On this basis, state regulation has
been justified by analogy to the established principles that relegate the
control of corporate management and relations among the shareholders
and directors of the law of the state of incorporation.47 The doctrine of the
"pseudo foreign" corporation, most prominently developed in California,
has been urged as a basis for further extending the reach of state takeover
regulation to corporations with substantial operations within a state that
nevertheless are incorporated under the laws of a foreign state."
Assumptions regarding the nature of a particular takeover act ob-
viously affect one's conclusions as to its constitutionality.49 Both the
"investor protection" and "corporate law" approaches have substantial
merit. Neither, however, paints the entire picture. In terms of general
corporate law principles, it seems fundamental that Delaware possesses
and has invoked a legitimate interest in protecting shareholders of Dela-
ware corporations, wherever they reside, from overreaching by manage-
ment. On the other hand, if viewed as essentially securities regulation
Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 521-25 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Securities Law and The Constitution]; see text accompanying note 65
infra.
11 See Shipman, Some Thoughts About The Role of State Takeover Legislation: The
Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 722, 723 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Shipman].
u See text accompanying note 21 supra.
'7 Under the "internal affairs" doctrine, matters affecting the relationships between the
shareholders and a corporation, and legal doctrines of corporate governance are resolved
under the law of the state of the company's incorporation. See generally Shipman, supra note
45, at 740-43.
" See Shipman, supra note 45, at 751-55. The psuedo foreign corporation doctrine seeks
to deal with the common phenomenon of a company incorporated in one state but doing
business largely in a second state. The second state may seek to assert jurisdiction over
matters historically governed by the law of the state of incorporation.
1' Commentators who agree on the fundamental nature of state takeover laws neverthe-
less have reached opposite conclusions regarding the laws' constitutionality. Compare Com-
merce Clause Limitations, supra note 43, at 1152-62 (state takeover laws are unconstitutional
investor protection measures) with Securities Law and the Constitution, supra note 44, at 532
(constitutional investor protection measures). A similar dichotomy appears among writers
who view the state laws as organic corporate law. Compare Langevoort, State Tender Offer
Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 213, 241-46
(1977) (state takeover statutes are unconstitutional as corporate law) with Shipman, supra
note 45 (state takeover statutes are constitutional as corporate law).
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measures, state takeover acts cannot be justified. As stated in one recent
comment, "a state cannot claim that it has an interest in protecting non-
residents and in regulating transactions that take place outside the
state." 0 A third body of law is also relevant. Under fairly well settled
principles,5 each state has a significant interest, which may or may not
be controlling, in regulating transactions "outside the state" insofar as
they have an impact within the state.
The law of the state of incorporation is often held applicable to stock
transfers, assessments, and agreements among shareholders of the corpora-
tion such as voting trusts, rights of first refusal and similar matters. 2 In
this sense the law of the state of incorporation regulates "transactions
outside the state" without raising anyone's eyebrows. Similarly, no one
would contend that a shareholder who is a nonresident of the state of
incorporation has no rights under that state's fiduciary doctrines. These
points are made not because they mandate the constitutionality of state
takeover statutes, but simply to illustrate that sweeping statements about
state regulation of transactions outside the state's borders, or protection
of interests of nonresidents are often misleadingly simplistic.
In addition to their interest in being able to decide intelligently whether
to buy or sell and how to vote their shares, shareholders have a more basic
interest in being treated fairly by management. Many corporate law doc-
trines designed to protect shareholders' interests thus amount to efforts to
prevent unfairness independent of any investor action.
Discussions of takeover legislation often do not distinguish between'
general shareholder interests and the more limited investor protection. For
example, the Kidwell court concluded that Congress's failure to adopt a
fiduciary approach to investor protection is a basis for rejecting the state
scheme which the Idaho authorities argued was designed as a shareholder
protective measure. However, Kidwell, which dealt with Idaho's efforts to
regulate a takeover of the Washington corporation, did not directly present
the shareholder issue, because the state of incorporation historically has
assumed the role of providing general shareholder protections, regardless
of the shareholder's residence.53 Legislatures certainly are competent to
conclude that a tender offer accomplishes something more in the nature
of a corporate transformation than simply a shift in ownership. Minimum
time limits on transfers in response to a tender offer may be viewed as
qualitatively the same as a prohibition against shareholder meetings on
less than x days' notice. Both time periods reflect substantive legislative
judgments that in a particular context state imposed delays are necessary
for a proper, or "fair" result, even if they have the effect of suspending
commerce. Finally, state takeover regulation may be viewed as not solely
" Securities Law and The Constitution, supra note 44, at 528.
" See text accompanying notes 95-99 infra.
5' W. FLErCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PmVATE CORPORATIONS §5473 (rev. perm. ed.
1975).
53 But see note 48 supra.
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a prohibition on the offeror, but also as a reciprocal limit on the sharehold-
ers' ability to transfer their interests. To the extent the state laws subject
the offeror to potential criminal liabilities, as most current versions do,
they plainly fall outside this rationale. However, simply voiding, or making
voidable, transfers under defined circumstances, seems consistent with
traditional exercises of legislative judgment in the field of shareholder-
corporate relations.
In addition to protecting shareholder and investor interests, states tra-
ditionally have enacted a variety of regulatory measures affecting corpora-
tions that have a substantial physical presence in the state, regardless of
corporate domicile or residence of the corporation's shareholders. The exer-
cise of these powers may affect corporations whose actions outside the state
have local impact. State antitrust laws present classic examples of this
phenomenon. The Sherman and Clayton Acts may, under some circum-
stances, impose less significant restrictions than state antitrust law. Nev-
ertheless, the federal statutes rarely preempt the antitrust field.
The fact that federal law tolerates certain conduct does not nec-
essarily mean there is an affirmative federal policy encouraging
such conduct. For example, federal law may tolerate certain small
mergers because .(1) they do not seem harmful to competition, and
(2) because they might achieve desirable economies or other re-
deeming virtues. The first reason for federal toleration implies no
affirmative federal policy favoring such a merger. Because the sec-
ond reason recognizes mere possibilities, it too does not seem to
reflect an affirmative federal policy in favor of the small merger. 4
The same is true in terms of other restraints imposed under state antitrust
law. The fact that Congress elected not to forbid it does not preclude the
states from taking that action.
In sum, states have an economic interest in regulating the corporations
doing business within their borders. Obviously, there are major limitations
on a state's ability to regulate transactions that have substantial signifi-
cance outside the state's borders as well as within them. State legislation
that allegedly infringes upon interstate commerce must meet a constitu-
tional balancing test. The state interest in regulating the local economy is
entitled to some consideration. At the other extreme, the parochial inter-
ests in protecting "local industry" or "incumbent management" often are
viewed as per se unconstitutional.55 One may question the propriety or
feasibility of attempting to divine the motives of the state legislatures in
adopting takeover legislation. Expressing the state's interest as protect-
ing incumbent management carries overtones that specific individuals
have somehow prevailed on the legislature to erect barriers to their invol-
5' 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 208 (1978).
' See, e.g., Developments In Tender Offers, supra note 25, at 229-30; Securities Law and
The Constitution, supra note 44, at 528.
56 Response to Great Western, supra note 1, at 895-905.
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untary retirement. Similarly, "protecting local industry" raises the spectre
of laws prohibiting the export of unprocessed fish to promote local can-
neries. Yet the "protection" accorded "local industry" by takeover legisla-
tion differs significantly from the conventional tariff. Takeover legislation
is aimed not at making local industry profitable, but rather at keeping it
locally controlled.
Thdse same interests may be described as the state's desire to prevent
the corporate headquarters and centralized decision making process of
significant economic entities within the state from being shifted precipi-
tously. State legislatures are not concerned with preserving the jobs of
specific individuals who happen to be "incumbent management." Rather,
it seems obvious from the huge majorities that most takeover legislation
received that the states are concerned with local control and localized
decision making responsibility. To be sure, where the states have sought
to assert jurisdiction over tender offers for corporations which have only
"substantial assets" within the state, this rationale collapses. However, if
the state's jurisdiction is grounded on the corporation's "principal place
of business" or some similar test, the state's interest may fairly be viewed
as attempting to promote polycentrism and localized control of economic
entities. The legitimacy of this interest, and whether it is an economic
interest or something else, calls for further analysis."
The Kidwell court recognized that corporations influence local life
through such actions such as making charitable contributions and their
commitments to social issues as pollution control or job safety. The Idaho
securities administrator contended that a state's interest in promoting
benevolent management serves to justify state regulation of the means by
which non-residents can change local management." While admitting the
legitimacy of this state interest, the Fifth Circuit found nothing in the
record to support the conclusion that all incumbent managers are model
corporate citizens or that "all offerors are vandals."59 Moreover, the court
found that Idaho's disclosure requirement was not an effective means of
encouraging civic responsibility, particularly where, as in Kidwell, most of
the shareholders were not residents of the state involved* 
0
To the extent that Kidwell's holding on this point merely reflects a
failure of the state of the record in that case, it is of little consequence.
However, to the extent it suggests that none of the state's principal inter-
ests is of a non-economic nature, it is debatable. Many national corpora-
tions undoubtedly are model corporate citizens of the communities in
which they reside. However, one intuitively concludes that, as a group,
locally based major businesses tend to be more involved in various aspects
of their community than branch operations of comparable size. The rea-
sons for this are many but some are fairly obvious. First, the branch opera-
,? See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
38 577 F.2d at 1282-83.
5, Id. at 1286.
so Id.
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tions tend to be under the administration of a plant manager, or, at best,
a vice-president of a national corporation who often sees his tour in that
plant as a step on a corporate ladder. He sees himself as less likely to
remain in the community forever, and therefore, is less committed to any
long term projects. Second, his fiscal authority normally is restricted. Typ-
ically, his ability to make a financial contribution either in cash or by
lending the services of skilled personnel to community projects is subject
to approval outside the community where the value of given projects ob-
viously may be less accurately perceived. The actual decision maker for the
branch office does not have to spend Sunday afternoon on the golf course
with other members of the community who have "done their part."6' The
fact that a locally managed major business is more likely to be involved
in community affairs than the same operation managed from outside the
state affects many aspects of community life including conventional chari-
ties, cultural activities, local education instructions, and professional ath-
letics. All of these activities in one way or another contribute to the
"quality of life" in local communities just as much as clean air or the
absence of billboards. To the extent the business community withholds its
support, the vitality and attractiveness of life in the community as a whole
undeniably deteriorates. The state's generally adverse response to in-
creased concentration in the American economy can be viewed as a realis-
tic effort to prevent this deterioration and upgrade the quality of their
citizens' lives. Although this "quality of life" interest is not purely eco-
nomic in nature, it still should be viewed as a major basis for the states'
obvious concern at the growth of the tender movement.
In sum, a state's effort to regulate takeovers may be prompted by one
or more of four different concerns. First, states wish to assure that resident
shareholders are given enough time and information to make an informed
judgment as to a transaction that is, in substance, a transformation of the
corporate structure. Second, takeover legislation may be viewed as an
exercise of the states' right to prescribe the attributes of a share of stock
in a corporation organized under their laws. Third, to the extent the stat-
ute seeks to impede the departure of corporate plant and facilities, it is
prompted by economic regulatory considerations. Fourth, to the extent
statutes apply to corporations headquartered in the state, it reflects the
states' desire to improve the quality of life within their borders.
VI. THE CONSTrrtmONAL ISSUES
Constitutional analysis of state takeover legislation presents two basic
issues: first, whether a federal statute expressly or impliedly preempts
state legislation in the area, and second, whether state takeover regulation
serves interests sufficient to justify the burdens the statutes often impose
, A similar analysis of the role of local industry has been urged as a basis for stronger
antitrust laws and enforcement policies. See Green, An Economic Analysis of Monopoly and
Anti-Competitive Power, 10 Sw. U. L. REv. 65, 72 (1978).
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on interstate commerce. 2 Because the Williams Act is the only federal
statute that arguably preempts state takeover legislation, the resolution of
the first of these questions is generally the same for most, if not all, of the
state laws. The Williams Act's legislative history, purpose and language
impact relatively uniformly on all state statutes despite their varied provi-
sions. All, to a greater or lesser degree, delay the offer beyond the period
that the Williams Act imposes. The commerce clause analysis, however,
varies considerably depending upon (a) the state statute's jurisdictional
basis, which is directly related to the state interest involved, and (b) the
substantive provisions of the state scheme and the degree of "burden" they
impose upon commerce.
In Kidwell, the Fifth Circuit held that the Idaho statute was preempted
"because the market approach to investor protection adopted by Congress
and the fiduciary approach adopted by Idaho are incompatible. ' ' 13 The
Kidwell court also 6bserved the oft-quoted language in a Senate Report of
the Williams Act that:
[t]he Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the
balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bid. The Bill is designed to require
full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same
time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to
fairly present their case."
Subsequent to Kidwell, two commentaries, based on different analyses,
have disputed the conclusion reached by the Fifth Circuit. 5 In short form,
the conclusion of one is that the purpose of the Williams Act was to protect
investors. The legislative history of the Williams Act indicates that the
"balance" was not an objective of the Williams Act, but at best a byprod-
uct of its investor protection rationale. Since the state laws do not conflict
with that purpose, there is no preemption. The second argues that the
Williams Act does not represent a pervasive federal scheme to regulate
tender offers. With this preliminary conclusion there can be little quarrel.
The analysis concludes that no conflict exists between the state and federal
legislation for three reasons. First, any conflict is, at most, indirect. Sec-
ond, there is no federal policy against initiating tender offers, and the state
laws actually restore the "balance" that Congress sought to avoid
"tipping." Finally, the state law's "fiduciary approach" and the "market
approach" of the Williams Act are really consistent because the delays
62 The Supreme Court has employed the test which balances the burdens imposed on
interstate commerce by state pursuit of legitimate local interests to assess state statutes
attacked under the commerce clause. See text accompanying notes 91-109 infra.
0 577 F.2d at 1279. The Kidwell court also believed preemption was dictated by the fact
that Idaho's disclosure requirements were especially burdensome, complex, and inconsistent
with federal requirements. Id. at 1280-81.
64 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
" See Response to Great Western, supra note 1; Securities Law and the Constitution,
supra note 44.
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engendered by state regulation promote orderly investor decisions.
A third line of argument is that the Supreme Court's recent holding in
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,66 that an offeror has no claim for money
damages under the Williams Act implies no pro-offeror congressional pur-
pose. From that it is argued that the state laws are not preempted, even if
they are "pro-management." The conclusion that the Williams Act does
not preempt all state takeover legislation seems correct. However, the
analysis leading to that conclusion is somewhat different from those here-
tofore suggested.
Various authorities have taken the position that § 28 of the Securities
Exchange Act neither requires or prevents preemption,17 because the state
laws are or are not "in conflict" with the Williams Act. However, the
"savings clause" embodied in § 28(a) has doubtful bearing on state takeo-
ver acts. The provision purports to protect the jurisdiction of state
"Securities Commissions." Takeover legislation is qualitatively different
from matters historically conferred upon securities commissioners. Analo-
gously, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 precludes injunctions against proceedings in state
courts. 8 However, an entity designated a "court" as a matter of state law
may not constitute a "court" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 9 The deter-
" 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
'1 Report of the Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus.
LAW. 187, 190 (1976) [hereinafter cited as State Takeover Statutes].
19 In relevant part, § 28(a) provides:
[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission
(or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security
or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). Section 2283 provides:
[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in
a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
"1 Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). In Roudebush, the plaintiff petitioned a
state court for a recount of votes cast in the 1970 Indiana senatorial election after the Indiana
Secretary of State had certified his opponent's victory to the Governor. Id. at 16-17. When
Senator Hartke's motion to dismiss the petition was denied, he sought the enjoin the recount
in federal district court. Id. at 17. A district judge temporarily restrained the recount pending
further litigation of the issues presented. Id. at 17. After Hartke won an interlocutory injunc-
tion, 321 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1972), Roudebush appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Roudebush contended that 28 U.S.C. § 2283, see note 68 supra, prohibited the district
court's injunction. 405 U.S. at 20. The Court noted that § 2283 bars only federal injunctions
of litigation or legal controversies in state court. Id. Although a state body may have judicial
powers, a federal court could enjoin its nonjudicial activities. Id. at 20-21. Under Indiana law,
the state court was required to grant a recount upon a timely and proper petition, and to
appoint commissioners to perform the recount. Id. at 21. The Court stated that these
"ministerial" or "administrative" functions were not judicial in nature because they did not
involve investigation, declaration and enforcement of liabilities as they stand on present or
past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. Id. (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)). Significantly, the Court also found that the state
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minitive factor under § 2283 is whether the function the state entity per-
forms is "judicial," and this is a question of federal law.70 Similarly, a state
agency designated as the "Securities Commission" should not enjoy any
special status under § 28 of the Securities Exchange Act simply by virtue
of the fact that that office is the designated state agency. Rather, a func-
tional analysis of the statute is required. Under that test, § 28 becomes
largely irrelevant to a consideration of the preemption question in enforc-
ing takeover statutes is different in kind from the matters traditionally
entrusted to state securities administrators. Of course, to the extent the
statute involved, like Delaware's involves no state securities administrator,
§ 28 is inapplicable by its terms.
Assuming § 28 is irrelevant to the analysis, the issue becomes, as
Kidwell recognized, whether the state acts are in conflict with the federal
regulatory scheme. If "conflict" means that compliance with one is impos-
sible without violating the other, there is no direct conflict between the
Williams Act and most state statutes. Consequently, preemption must
hinge on whether state laws conflict with the federal scheme or purpose
embodied in the Williams Act.
The Williams Act's legislative history demonstrates only that Congress
intended to avoid imposing substantial federal regulation of tender offers
except in a few areas such as proration. Although the Senate and House
Reports express Congress's desire to avoid tipping the 1968 balance be-
tween offerors and targets, that desire is not equivalent to a legislative
decision to perpetuate the existing situation. In urging the enactment of
the Williams Act, the SEC focused entirely on disclosure to investors and
investor protection. It expressly disclaimed the "social and economic" ar-
guments urged in opposition to the Williams Act.7 Opponenits argued that
the Act would deter tender offers by generating litigation about the ade-
quacy of disclosure which in turn would create the opportunity for delay.
At the same time, these opponents viewed tender offers as desirable means
of creating a market in corporate control and facilitating the removal of
inefficient management. Accordingly, it was contended that a federal
tender offer law was inappropriate or undesirable.72 On the other hand,
some testimony supported prefiling requirements similar to those in some
state laws, principally on the ground that incumbent management did not,
under the existing law, have the time to organize a defense or to respond
adequately to the offer.7" After hearing these positive and negative eco-
court's role in the recount process involved functions similar to those that "nonjudicial func-
tionaries" often make while processing other kinds of applications. Id. at 21-22. The Court
buttressed its position by noting that technically Hartke's complaint had sought to enjoin
the recount commission's procedures, and not the state court's. Id. at 22, n.17.
10 See note 69 supra; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (defin-
ing judicial function).
1' Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 196-97.
712 Id. at 137.
73 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 7.
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nomic and business policy arguments, both the Senate and the House
reported their desire to avoid "tipping the balance."
In sum, the legislative history indicates that Congress merely desired
to leave the situation as it found it, rather than to perpetuate the existing
business balance to the exclusion of state legislation. Otherwise stated, the
situation as Congress found it in 1968 was that the states could regulate
tender offers within the confines of the commerce clause. Congress, by
avoiding tipping the balance, left that situation intact.
Subsequent "legislative history" bears inconclusively on the legislative
intent issue. Senator Williams, writing in 1977, appears to believe that all
state legislation is inconsistent with the Williams Act.74 On the other hand,
House Judiciary Chairman Rodino, in explaining the 1976 Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,7" stated that a company could cir-
cumvent delays required by federal antitrust laws by reincorporating in a
state with an antitakeover law.76 The viability of such a "defense" appears
to assume that state takeover laws are legitimate.
The Supreme Court on two occasions has divined a purpose in the
Williams Act not to favor either side in tender offers.7 More recently, in
Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland,'7 the Court was faced with a
Maryland statute prohibiting oil companies from owning gasoline stations.
It also requires that any allowances given by refiners be given to all retail-
ers in the state. 79 Exxon contended that because § 2(b) of the Robinson-
Patman Act did not prohibit the oil companies from granting all types of
allowances," the Maryland statute could not accomplish that end. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that § 2(b) created no
federal right to grant allowances." Accordingly, there was no preemption.
The Fourth Circuit also has rejected a claim that a Virginia statute, regu-
7, See Developments In Tender Offers, supra note 25 at xvii-xxi.
7 Pub. L. 94-435, 90 Stat.. 1383 (1976).
" 122 CONG. REc. 10293 (1976), quoted in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d at 1278.
71 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc, 430 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1977). See also Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
78 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
11 "Allowances" are temporary price reductions, which oil refiners grant to their retailers
in response to price cuts by competing retailers. Id. at 122-23. The Maryland statute, id. at
120 n.1, was a reaction against refiners favoring company-operated retail gas stations. Id. at
121; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E (Cum. Supp. 1978).
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). Section 2(b) places the burden of rebutting a prima facie
case of price or service discrimination upon the person charged with the illegal conduct. A
showing that the conduct was undertaken in good faith to meet a competitor's equally low
price serves to rebut the prima facie case. Id.
S1 437 U.S. at 132. The Court thought it would be "illogical" to assume that by providing
a limited defense to discriminatory pricing Congress meant to preclude state power in the
field. Id. Moreover, inferring preemption would have been improper "because the basic pur-
poses of the state statute and the Robinson-Patman Act are similar. Both reflect a policy
choice favoring the interest in equal treatment of all customers over the interest in allowing
sellers freedom to make selective coipetitive decisions." Id. at 132-33.
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lating locations of automobile dealerships, was preempted by the federal
Dealers Day in Court Act.12 The fact that Congress rejected a proposal
similar to that which Virginia enacted was not enough to create the direct
conflict the Fourth Circuit found necessary for preemption.8 Although the
Williams Act failed to "create a new federal right" in offerors for money
damages, arguably it created some right in offerors, for example, to seek
injunctive relief against inadequate management disclosures. 4 Accord-
ingly, even if Chris-Craft did not preclude preemption by rejecting a pro-
offeror congressional purpose,85 the issue is not whether the Williams Act
conferred any rights whatever on offerors. Rather, it is whether there is a
federal right to be free of state legislated delay. The legislative history and
language of the Act suggest a negative response.
On February 2, 1979, the SEC issued a number of proposed rules under
the Williams Act.8 These, to a large extent, replace proposed rules issued
initially in 1976 but never adopted. They are the subject of extensive
comment by the American Bar Association and others, in many cases
questioning whether the proposed rules exceed the Commission's authority
under the statutes. One provision is particularly significant for present
purposes. The SEC, in proposed rule 14(e)-l(a), would require that a
tender offer remain open for a minimum of 30 business days, or approxi-
mately six weeks. This requirement obviously is designed to meet the
contentions that the tender movement had gone too far. 7 The Commission
asserted that it desired to promulgate a uniform national rule. Recognizing
that the state statutes had been enacted in response to legitimate concerns,
the Commission wished to avoid any problems that potentially could arise
in the context of the conflicting and confusing state regulatory patterns.8
Since the proposed rule is promulgated pursuant to the Williams Act, the
SEC is proposing a rule that, if valid, effectively eliminates the argument
that a six week delay conflicts with the Williams Act. However, Congress
manifested its intention not to impose time limitations beyond a seven or
ten day minimum offer period. 8 Whether the rule would be subject to
" American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. pending. The Virginia statute prohibits automobile manufacturers from granting
franchises for a particular line of cars in a trade area already served by other dealers in that
line unless the manufacturer first notifies the other dealers. VA. CODE § 46.1-547(d) (Cum.
Supp. 1978). Moreover, if the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles determines that the trade area
will not support additional dealerships, he may prohibit completely franchise grants in the
area. Id.
592 F.2d at 224 (citing H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1956]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4596, 4603-04).
U See Pitt, Standing To Sue Under The Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship
On Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117, 186-87 (1978).
See text accompanying note 66 supra.
" See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15548, Feb. 5, 1979, reprinted in' [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,935 [hereinafter cited as SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15548].
'7 State Takeover Statutes and The Williams Act, supra note 67, at 198.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15548, supra note 86, at 81,236.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5), (6) (1976).
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attack on the grounds that its terms conflict with the dictates of the statute
remains to be seen. Yet an offeror may be reluctant to initiate such a
challenge. In order to do so, the offeror initially would have to proceed in
violation of the rule, thereby risking significant civil liability and forced
termination of the offer. At best the offeror would lose the advantage of
going forward without advance public notice. Whatever the ultimate reso-•
lution of the potential conflict, we find in 1979 the SEC, having success-
fully argued as amicus curiae in Kidwell that the Williams Act preempts
state imposed six week delays, now proposing a six week delay as an appro-
priate implementation of the Williams Act.
The Kidwell court found the commerce clause challenge to the Idaho
statute persuasive. Most comments have dealt with the abstract compati-
bility of the commerce clause and state takeover legislation. However, the
nexus between the particular target and the regulatory state is a basic
consideration in any discussion of the compatibility of state takeover legis-
lation and the commerce clause. As observed above,90 differing connections
between the state and the target evince quite different state interests. If
incorporation is the test, either the state interest in shareholder protection,
its internal affairs, or both is involved. If principal place of business is the
test, both economic and quality of life considerations become significant.
If substantial corporate assets is the state contact test, then the state's
interest more clearly approaches economic protectionism.
The residence of the target's shareholders is a factor that underlies all
of these diverse state interests. Section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act
arguably legitimizes an investor protection interest similar, if not identi-
cal, to that fostered by the Williams Act. Many of the existing state laws
raise additional issues in that the investors they protect are not within the
protecting state's borders. In recognition of this, the proposed Federal
Securities Code expressly would preempt state takeover legislation except
as to corporations with their principal place of business in the state and a
majority of their shareholders in the state.' This resolution is essentially
a political compromise between the Code's draftsmen and the state securi-
ties administrators. It reflects concern for both investor protection inter-
ests (shareholder residence) and quality of life or "economic and social"
considerations (principal place of business). Thus, at least impliedly, the
proposed Code would recognize legitimate noninvestor considerations in
establishing the appropriateness of state regulation.
Kidwell, on the other hand, expressly rejected the notion that anything
other than economic considerations were involved in the Idaho takeover
law as applied to Sunshine Mining.9 2 From this premise the court pro-
ceeded to apply the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church Inc.. 3 In Pike,
" See text accompanying notes 41-56 supra.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITrrTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE PROPOSED OFIcIAL DRAFr § 1904(c)
(1978).
92 577 F.2d at 1282 n.54.
'2 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
[Vol. XXXVI
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
the Court capsulized the proper commerce clause analysis, stating that
[W]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legit-
imate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with
a lesser impact on interstate activities. 4
There can be no doubt that a state takeover law has an impact on inter-
state commerce in the sense that it prohibits interstate transactions in
securities until the state's requirements are met. However, the same can
be said of state regulatory measures that have been upheld against consti-
tutional attack. Notable among these decisions is American Can Co. v.
Oregon Liquor Control Commission,95 which validated a state environmen-
tal law prohibiting the use of nonreturnable containers. To be sure, the
Oregon prohibition is not "extraterritorial" in the sense that state takeover
legislation operates on stockholders who are outside the state. On the other
hand, the legislation clearly was enacted without the participation of af-
fected interests such as outside canners and bottlers, and it plainly has
economic as well as noneconomic aspects. Similarly, state legislation di-
rected towards protection of local employment opportunities has been de-
scribed as almost as well insulated against constitutional attack as state
laws having health and other nonfinancial aspects." In the case of state
regulation justified by both principal place of business and substantial
assets hooks, these "noncomparable state interests" may well justify more
burdensome regulation than the more directly economic interests with
which the Kidwell court believed it was dealing.. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently has evinced an increasing will-
ingness to permit state economic regulation that has obvious national im-
plications. A most noteworthy example is Exxon Corporation v. Governor
of Maryland, which sustained Maryland's law prohibiting major oil com-
panies from owning retail outlets in that state. 7 Viewed from the point of
view of the economy as a whole, rather than the shareholders, a tender
offer's transformation of a locally managed independent corporation into
a national corporation is substantially identical on a larger scale to the sale
of an independent gasoline station to a major oil company. The Exxon
Court observed the Maryland law did not "stop" interstate commerce, it
merely regulated persons who send petroleum products through interstate
" Id. at 142.
'5 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973).
" See L. TRaBE, AMEIcAN CONsTrruioNAI, LAW % 6-12 (1978).
See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
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commerce into Maryland." Similarly, state takeover legislation affects
target companies' ownership rather than their operations. The Maryland
statute also effectively promotes independent ownership of gasoline sta-
tions. In this sense, the statute resembles the state takeover laws if one
accepts the hostile characterization of the takeover statute as a means to
protect management. Both state laws in some sense "restrict" the ability
of the respectively affected shareholders to dispose of their property. Or,
conversely, both restrict the affected companies' "right" to acquire prop-
erty. Each law applies regardless of the citizenship of the affected corpora-
tion's owners."
Another significant aspect of state legislation is the potential for con-
flicting state regulation. Obviously, if multiple states regulate the same
transaction under different timetables, and impose inconsistent substan-
tive requirements, that potential exists with its attendant impermissible
burden on commerce. 00 However, to the extent the law is limited to targets
incorporated in the regulating state, full faith and credit should require
that the state's laws be honored.'"' Whether in fact such conflicts exist to
any material degree under present state legislation is unclear. No case has
yet invalidated a state's laws on the basis of such a conflict. However, as
discussed above, in at least one case a state commissioner has declined
jurisdiction over a takeover on the basis that the law of the state of incorpo-
ration had a conflicting timetable.' 2
If there is a conflict between the takeover law of the state of incorpora-
tion and that of any other state, both the commerce clause and full faith
and credit seem to dictate that the law of the state of incorporation should
control.' 3 Historically, corporations qualifying to do business in a foreign
state, have entered the foreign state clothed with their own corporate law.
Moreover, the right to impose, in effect, a restraint on alienation of the
shareholders' property, which is one way of viewing the effect of the takeo-
ver legislation, historically has been viewed as resting with the state of
incorporation. In Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v.
Wolfe,'04 the Supreme Court invoked this doctrine to give "worldwide"
effect to the law of the state of a mutual insurance company's domicile in
determining the enforceability of the company's bylaw that established a
437 U.S. at 125-29.
, See also New Motor Veh. Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). In Orrin Fox,
the Court upheld California's law that closely paralleled the Virginia statute at issue in
American Motors. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra. Both cases evidence a more
benign judicial attitude towards state regulatory schemes in general.
100 See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
'" See text accompanying note 34 supra.
102 See text accompanying'notes 32-34 supra.
'1 See Horwitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine,
84 HAav. L. REv. 806 (1971); Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice
of Law and The Impact of Full Faith And Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1958).
1o4 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
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six month time limit for filing claims.105 The criticism that the
"extraterritorial" impact of some state statutes is not justified by a legiti-
mate state interest derives from viewing the state legislation exclusively
as investor protection measures. 106
The Idaho statute at issue in Kidwell-applied to companies with sub-
stantial business in the state."7 Consequently, the statute principally ef-
fectuated the state economic interests. 10 The corporate law justifications,
major investor protection considerations, and the factors involved in shift-
ing a corporate domicile were all lacking. In this context the Pike balancing
test is appropriate and may well require invalidation of the state regulation
under the commerce clause. However, it is doubtful whether balancing is
appropriate at all where the statute involves noneconomic considera-
tions.0 9 In any event, the states' noneconomic interests at least are entitled
to greater weight than the Kidwell court accorded them. This is particu-
larly true if the regulating state is the target's state of incorporation as well
as the physical situs of its operations and headquarters. Against these must
be balanced the degree of regulation sought. In order to accomplish any-
thing in the nature of permitting more time for allowing an auction market
to develop in the event an offer is made, or to increase the risks of success
and thereby deter offers, it is necessary that the state regulate all share-
holders wherever situated. The manner of regulation is the only point of
flexibility. To take an extreme example, if a state were to seek to prohibit
tender offers altogether, although no state has sought to do so, it would
obviously require some unusual degree of regulatory purpose such as insur-
ance regulation. At the other end of the spectrum, statutes with built in
limitations on the time delays inherent in compliance and with no signifi-
cant overlay of inconsistent substantive or disclosure requirements may
withstand attack. They may be considered essentially noneconomic, or in
the words of Kidwell "noncomparable," regulation. Alternatively, the bur-
dens they impose on interstate commerce may not be deemed sufficiently
great to outweigh the state's interest.
The numerous combinations and permutations of underlying state in-
terests, and the various possible corporate presences within a state make
it virtually impossible to reach an abstract conclusion as to propriety of
state takeover regulation. It is fair to say that much of the existing legisla-
tion on the books is constitutionally defective under Kidwell as applied to
some corporations to which it might be applied. However, even in light of
the Supreme Court's decision not to address the substantive issues Kidwell
"I Id. at 609. See also Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938) (state law providing for
rehabilitation of an insolvent insurance company).
108 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
'o See note 30 supra.
108 See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
80, The Kidwell court noted that the Pike test might not be appropriate where the benefit
of state legislation and the burden it places on interstate commerce are "noncomparable."
577 F.2d at 1282 n.54.
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raised,"" more restrained exercises of state power, both in terms of limita-
tion upon the corporations to whom the statute applies, and the burden
the regulatory scheme imposes on interstate commerce, should be sustain-
able. This is particularly true in the case of those state statutes that apply
only to corporations incorporated under the enacting state's laws, thereby
eliminating the possibility of duplicative state schemes, and those whose
minimum time limitations do not render success highly doubtful. The 30
business days suggested by the SEC, and the 30 day minimum period
recommended by a committee of the American Bar Association"' appear
to be within the acceptable range.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is certainly a legitimate basis for reaching an affirmative conclu-
sion to the question posed in Arthur Liman's 1978 Article: Has The Tender
Movement Gone Too Far?"'2 Whether one agrees or disagrees that statutory
restraints should be placed upon the tender offer as a tool for corporate
consolidation, there can be no doubt that there is room for legitimate
debate on the point as the SEC acknowledged in proposing Rule 14(e)-i (a).
Until Congress acts, as the ALI Federal Securities Code suggests, or until
the SEC itself adopts rules designed to curb the Saturday Night Special,
states should continue to serve legitimately as Brandeisian little laborato-
ries, as Professor Shipman suggested they should do almost a decade ago."3
It is obvious that the tender offer has not been put in the deep freeze by
the "chilling effect" of state legislation as some predicted."' No documen-
tation of the claimed chilling effect has been offered. Given the business
confidentiality accorded to offers considered but never made, any such
documentation likely will not be forthcoming. In this climate of conflicting
value judgments as to the desirability of the tender offer, a state's interests
should justify minimal regulation, at least as to those corporations incorpo-
rated under the law of the state, and with their corporate headquarters and
significant assets there in the state. Actual shareholder residence is vir-
tually impossible to identify in a tender offer's time parameters due to the
large number of institutional holdings of securities of most publicly owned
companies. Accordingly, that jurisdictional hook should not be required.
In the case of a company incorporated in the state of its corporate head-
quarters, it will be a rare case in which there are not substantial sharehold-
ings in the state. As to these corporations in which they have a major stake,
states should be allowed to continue to regulate the pace at which an
acquisition may be accomplished.
If the basic premise of this article is correct, some corporations may
110 99 S.Ct. 2710, 2715 (1979).
State Takeover Statutes, supra note 67, at 194.
,,2 3 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 687 (1978).
,,3 See Shipman, supra note 45.
"I See, e.g., Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43 Omo BAR J. 65, 73 (1970).
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have no single state to whom they have a sufficient nexus to warrant the
application of that state's laws to the exclusion of others. Under present
constitutional and state choice of law doctrines, the state of incorporation
is entitled to deference to the extent regulation is viewed as "corporate
laws." However, a realistic view is that the dominant state interest is in
the preservation of independent economic entities. As a result, the legisla-
tive judgment reflected in the proposed Federal Securities Code is correct
that the state in which the target has its principal place of business should
be permitted to regulate to the exclusion of all others. That, however, will
take an act of Congress. Its resolution by courts remains to be seen.

